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Abstract
On December 22, 1994, the Mexican government allowed the peso to float freely against the
US dollar, aggravating the run on peso deposits, leading to the rapid devaluation of the peso,
and sparking the peso crisis. The following week, the Bank of Mexico announced that the
Mexican deposit insurer would fully guarantee all commercial bank deposits and liabilities
except subordinated debt. The announcement of the blanket guarantee appeared effective at
reassuring foreign investors, as the central bank was soon able to ease the liquidity support
that it had been providing to banks during the crisis. The government created a deposit
insurer, the Bank Fund for Savings Protection (Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro, or
FOBAPROA), in 1990. Over the next two years the government privatized governmentowned banks. Every December, the Bank of Mexico was responsible for announcing which
bank liabilities FOBAPROA would cover and the coverage limit for the following year. In its
1993 statement, under financial and political pressure, the Bank of Mexico announced a
similar blanket guarantee of bank deposits and liabilities as a preemptive measure to
reassure market participants about the soundness of the newly privatized banking system.
The Mexican government took a number of other actions to protect the banking system as
the financial crisis deepened in 1994 and 1995. The central bank opened a US dollar credit
window for commercial banks; the government also charged FOBAPROA with bank
recapitalization and the purchase of nonperforming loans from troubled banks. In December
1998, the Mexican Congress replaced FOBAPROA with the Institute for the Protection of
Bank Savings. This move corresponded with a gradual transition from FOBAPROA’s blanket
guarantee to a more limited guarantee. The gradual reduction of the guarantee began in 1999
and ended in 2005.
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Overview
On December 22, 1994, the Mexican
government allowed the peso to float freely
against the US dollar, aggravating the run on
peso deposits. Prior to this announcement
there was significant political turmoil, which,
combined with weakened demand for peso
assets and the government’s issuing shortterm dollar-indexed notes, left the Mexican
government vulnerable in the event of a peso
devaluation. Ultimately, the government
decision to let the peso float led to the rapid
devaluation of the peso and sparked the
Mexican peso crisis. The following week, the
Bank of Mexico announced that the Mexican
deposit insurer would cover all commercial
bank deposits and liabilities except
subordinated debt. The announcement
appeared effective at reassuring foreign
investors, as the central bank was able to
ease the liquidity support that it had been
providing to banks before the announcement
(Laeven and Valencia 2008).

Key Terms
Purpose: “[T]o protect investors from any loss in
case of insolvency of Credit Institutions” (Haber
2005, 2333).
Launch Date(s)

Announcement:
December 30, 1993, and
December 29, 1994

End Date(s)

Gradually removed
from 1999 to 2005

Eligible Institutions

All commercial banks

Eligible Liabilities

All unsubordinated
liabilities

Fees

Monthly contributions
from commercial banks,
calculated annually
based on the amount of
protected liabilities

Coverage

Unknown

The total cost of
The government had created a deposit Outcomes
Mexico’s crisis policy
insurer, the Bank Fund for Savings
was about 15% of its
Protection (Fondo Bancario de Protección al
GDP in 1998
Ahorro, or FOBAPROA), in 1990. Over the
next two years the government privatized Notable Features
FOBAPROA purchased
nonperforming loans
government-owned banks through auctions
and recapitalized banks
that ended in July 1992. (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Zamarripa 2002). Between 1991
and 1994, the proportion of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in Mexican banks rose from 4.1%
to 7.3%, gross past-due loans tripled, and total real bank lending doubled, outpacing growth
in deposits (Haber 2008; Hernandez-Murillo 2007).

Every December, the Bank of Mexico was responsible for announcing FOBAPROA’s coverage
limit for the next year (Bank of Mexico 1993; 1994). In 1993 and 1994, when Mexico began
experiencing a financial crisis, instead of setting a specific coverage limit, the Bank of
Mexico’s statements established a guarantee on all liabilities of commercial banks except
subordinated debt (Haber 2005; World Bank 1998). The 1993 announcement was
preemptive, to protect the recently privatized banking system, and the 1994 announcement
followed the Mexican peso crisis. Similar announcements were made every year through
1997 (Mackey 1999).
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Political turmoil during 1994 and 1995 and authorities’ allowing the peso to float in
December 1994 added further pressure (Laeven and Valencia 2008). The crisis of 1994 and
1995 led to a more than 90% depreciation of the peso, an increase in interest rates, inflation
greater than 50%, and a decline in GDP by 6.2% by the end of 1995 (Sánchez 2009). The
rapid rise of interest rates led performing, risky loans into default, creating a growing share
of NPLs and a shrinking deposit base. The National Banking and Securities Commission
(Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, or CNBV) took over banks that were in serious
distress—replacing management, suspending shareholder rights, removing NPLs and
injecting capital through FOBAPROA, and arranging for the bank to be sold to another
institution. In total, the CNBV took over 12 banks between 1994 and 1997 (Graf 1999; Haber
2008). The total cost of Mexico’s crisis policy was about 15% of its GDP in 1998.
At the beginning of the blanket guarantee, the Mexican government announced that it was a
temporary measure and ultimately would be replaced by limited deposit protection (IADI
2005). In December 1998, Congress replaced FOBAPROA with the Institute for the
Protection of Bank Savings (Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario, or IPAB). This
move corresponded with a transition from FOBAPROA’s blanket guarantee to a limited
guarantee (Hernandez-Murillo 2007). The government gradually reduced IPAB’s deposit
guarantee between 1999 and 2005 to avoid disrupting banks (Sánchez 2009).
Summary Evaluation
In a 1998 report, the World Bank commends Mexico’s bank support programs for restoring
“a degree of confidence in the Mexican banking system,” stating that the blanket guarantee
was “an underpinning of this confidence” (World Bank 1998, 16). In 2008, Laeven and
Valencia, two International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists, note that following the 1994
announcement, the central bank’s liquidity support to banks declined, suggesting that
depositor withdrawals had eased. The IMF paper points to this as evidence that the blanket
guarantee was initially successful in improving public confidence (Laeven and Valencia
2008).
Another issue the World Bank brings up is that the guarantee distorted banks’ incentives and
was an obstacle to adequate supervision. Mexico had only recently privatized its banks and,
as noted by the World Bank, there was a long-standing implicit guarantee because of the
government’s relationship with the banking system. This implicit guarantee was an obstacle
to market-based supervision of banks. The World Bank also notes that the broad guarantee
made bank resolutions more costly than if the government had forced large depositors and
bond holders to share in the losses from bank failures (World Bank 1998). The guarantee
covered all banks regardless of creditworthiness, and some analysts observe this as having
given banks with lower capital an incentive to take on more risk (Hernandez-Murillo 2007).
During this period, some bankers took advantage of the guarantee by making large loans to
themselves and then defaulting on the loans. From 1995 to 1998, 20% of large loans went to
bank directors—these loans had a 4% lower rate of interest, 33% higher probability of
default, and 30% lower collateral recovery rate than arm’s-length loans (Haber 2008).
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One of the reasons the party in power at the time lost control of Congress in 1997 was that
the actions of the CNBV and FOBAPROA were perceived by many as a bailout of wealthy
stockholders financed by taxpayers. The new Congress carried out a nine-month
investigation into FOBAPROA and the bailout and ultimately disbanded FOBAPROA and
replaced it with IPAB (Haber 2008).
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The 1993 and 1994 announcements indicate that the purpose of the
blanket guarantee was “to protect investors from any loss in case of insolvency of
Credit Institutions.”
In 1990, Mexico created FOBAPROA, a deposit insurance system. Then, in 1991 and 1992,
the government privatized the Mexican banking system (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Zamarripa 2002). In December 1992, the Bank of Mexico announced FOBAPROA’s coverage
limit for 1993. Then in December 1993, to preemptively protect the newly privatized
banking system, the Bank of Mexico announced its intention to protect all liabilities the next
year. A similar statement was made in December 1994 following a run on the peso (Haber
2008). The Bank of Mexico’s announcement in both years noted that there was an
established “tradition that the Mexican financial authorities try to protect investors from any
loss in case of insolvency of Credit Institutions” (Mackey 1999, 53). The historically close
relationship between the Mexican government and the banking system adds context to why
the Bank of Mexico was so quick to express its intent to guarantee all unsubordinated
liabilities in 1993, before the crisis was in full force.
2. Part of a Package: The Mexican government adopted the blanket guarantee as part
of a larger bailout of the country’s banking system that included establishing a US
dollar credit window for commercial banks, recapitalization, and restructuring.
During the Mexican financial crisis, the Mexican government used several measures to
stabilize the financial system in addition to the blanket guarantee. The central bank opened
a US dollar credit window for commercial banks; the government also charged FOBAPROA
with recapitalizing banks and buying NPLs from troubled banks (Haber 2008; Sánchez
2009). When needed, the CNBV resolved failing banks. In total, the CNBV took over 12 failing
banks—suspending shareholder rights, replacing management, buying NPLs and injecting
capital through FOBAPROA, and facilitating the sale of the bank. The CNBV did not resolve
the two largest banks but did replace their management and find merger partners. Notably,
several of Mexico’s banks were considered too big to fail, specifically the two largest banks,
which were not completely resolved. FOBAPROA’s purchases of NPLs lasted through 1998.
The Mexican government also received funding from the IMF to address the liquidity
problem caused by short-term obligations maturing. The IMF funding intended to convert
short-term debt and reverse the depreciation of the peso (IMF 1996). The United States’
Exchange Stabilization Fund also allowed the US to assist Mexico via swap lines, starting in
1994 (GAO 1996). These swap lines from the Federal Reserve for USD 30 billion lasted until
October 2009 (Sánchez 2009).
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3. Legal Authority: In 1990 the Mexican government established a deposit insurance
agency, FOBAPROA, which the Mexican congress disbanded in 1998.
On July 18, 1990, the Mexican government adopted the Credit Institutions Law to establish
a framework for banking in the private sector (World Bank 1995). The same year, the
administration created a deposit insurance agency, FOBAPROA (Hernandez-Murillo 2007).
FOBAPROA was governed under the principal statute governing the activities of commercial
banks, Article 122 of the Credit Institutions Law. This article established the goal of
FOBAPROA, to “provide preventative support to commercial banks and protect savings”
(World Bank 1995, 96–97). This article also required the Bank of Mexico to, each December,
announce the maximum amount that would be covered by FOBAPROA the next year.
In 1993 and 1994, FOBAPROA did not announce a deposit insurance limit, instead making a
statement establishing an intention to cover all liabilities except for subordinated debt
(Laeven and Valencia 2008).
FOBAPROA was also used for other banking policy. In 1995, FOBAPROA was used by the
Bank of Mexico to offer short-term dollar-denominated credit to banks (Hernandez-Murillo
2007). As part of the banking system bailout, FOBAPROA held government funds to be used
to help banks, and the government used FOBAPROA to purchase NPLs from troubled banks
(Haber 2008).
In 1998, Congress disbanded FOBAPROA and replaced it with IPAB.
4. Administration: The Bank of Mexico managed FOBAPROA.
The Bank of Mexico was responsible for FOBAPROA’s day-to-day operations (World Bank
1995).
5. Governance: FOBAPROA’s policy decisions were made by a Technical Committee
with representatives from the Bank of Mexico, Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit, and the National Banking and Securities Commission.
The Technical Committee had nine members, four named by the minister of finance and
public credit, one being the minister, three members appointed by the Bank of Mexico, one
being the governor, and two members appointed by the CNBV, one being the president of the
commission (World Bank 1995).
In 1998, after the bailout, a different party gained control of Congress and conducted a ninemonth investigation into the bailout. Ultimately, Congress disbanded FOBAPROA and
replaced it with IPAB (Haber 2008). IPAB was required to periodically publish its financial
statements and report regularly to Congress (IMF 1999). FOBAPROA had never made its
financial statements publicly available as of 1995 (World Bank 1995).
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6. Communication: The blanket guarantee was introduced through announcements
in 1993 and 1994 that expressed an intent to protect investors in case of
insolvency.
The Bank of Mexico was responsible for announcing FOBAPROA’s deposit coverage amount
every December; in December 1993 and 1994, it did not announce a limit and instead
announced a guarantee of all liabilities except subordinated debt. The announcement of a
blanket guarantee in 1994 appeared to promote market confidence, as the Bank of Mexico
was able to quickly reduce the liquidity support it provided to banks (Laeven and Valencia
2008). The Mexican government also announced that the blanket guarantee was a temporary
measure and ultimately would be replaced by limited deposit protection (IADI 2005).
7. Source(s) and Size of Funding: Funds came from commercial banks and the Bank
of Mexico.
FOBAPROA’s funding came from contributions from commercial banks and loans from the
Bank of Mexico. The banks’ contributions were based on the amount of liabilities protected
by FOBAPROA. The central bank and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit were
authorized to fund FOBAPROA. Article 122 of the Credit Institutions Law stated that the
minister could establish contributions to be paid by the commercial banks to fund
FOBAPROA (World Bank 1995).
The Bank of Mexico was supposed to be fully reimbursed for loans to FOBAPROA through
contributions from the banking community and the liquidation of assets.
8. Eligible Institutions: All commercial banks established in Mexico were eligible.
The blanket guarantee covered all commercial banks (World Bank 1998).
9. Eligible Liabilities: All unsubordinated liabilities were eligible.
The blanket guarantee covered all unsubordinated liabilities, including interbank deposits
as of the 1995 announcement (Laeven and Valencia 2008; World Bank 1998). The guarantee
covered all deposits equally, regardless of the creditworthiness of a bank or the amount of
its deposits (Hernandez-Murillo 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa 2002). The
guarantee excluded liabilities resulting from “illicit, irregular, or bad faith operations”
(Mackey 1999, 53).
10. Fees: Contributions from commercial banks were made to FOBAPROA every
month and calculated annually based on the amount of covered liabilities.
Commercial banks funded FOBAPROA through contributions calculated annually and paid
monthly. Banks’ contributions consisted of ordinary and extraordinary contributions
collected by the Bank of Mexico—ordinary contributions could be up to 0.5% of protected

280

Mexico

Schaefer-Brown

liabilities and extraordinary3 contributions could be up to 0.7% of protected liabilities
(World Bank 1995).
11. Process for Exercising Guarantee: The process associated with exercising the
guarantee is not clear.
Research did not reveal the process for exercising the guarantee.
12. Other Restrictions: Article 122 of the Credit Institutions Law provided FOBAPROA
could require a guarantee from banks receiving preventative support.
Article 122 of the Credit Institutions Law, which governed FOBAPROA, provided that if a
troubled bank received preventive support, FOBAPROA could require a guarantee from that
bank. This guarantee could be in the form of a lien over the shares of the bank. Later
amendments to the Credit Institutions Law specified that FOBAPROA’s lien was preferential
over preexisting encumbrances and allowed FOBAPROA to exercise corporate rights
associated with the shares without executing the lien over the shares (World Bank 1995).
13. Duration: The blanket guarantee was announced in December 1993 as a
temporary measure, though there was no specified end date at the time.
In December 1993, the Bank of Mexico did not announce a limit to FOBAPROA’s deposit
insurance coverage for the following year, creating a preemptive blanket guarantee for the
next year. A year later, in 1994, the Bank of Mexico made a similar announcement instead of
setting a limit for FOBAPROA, this time following the peso crisis (Laeven and Valencia 2008).
Mexican authorities said that the guarantee would be a temporary measure when the
measure was put in place, and it was gradually removed starting in 1999 and ending in 2005
(IADI 2005; Sánchez 2009).

3

The circumstances under which extraordinary contributions would be collected are unknown.
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